Patricia M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Patricia M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Caine; Richards, Caine & Allen; Attorney for Appellan.
Mark A. Larsen; Dart, Adamson & Kasting; Attorney for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Wade v. Burke, No. 890135 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1644
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKbl NO. 
IN THE UTAH COURT Of APPEALS m 
PATRICIA M. WADE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890135 
Category 14b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This Appeal is from Judge Homer F. Wilkinson's Order 
dated December 2, 1988, entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
310 South Main, Suite #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Fl \vJ 
OCT 6*^9 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA M. WADE, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. BURKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890135 
Category 14b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This Appeal is from Judge Homer F. Wilkinson's Order 
dated December 2, 1988, entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
MARK A. LARSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
310 South Main, Suite #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT 
THE CLAIMS SET FORTH IN HIS MOTION 5 
POINT II 
IF THIS COURT REVERSES THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION, IT WILL CLEARLY HAVE AN EFFECT 
UPON THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT AGAINST BOTH 
DEFENDANT AND MRS . MAXWELL 6 
POINT III 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A 
THREE (3) YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
POINT IV 
COUNSEL ASSERTS WITHOUT ANY FOUNDATION 
WHATSOEVER, THAT BECAUSE THIS MATTER WAS 
PURSUED BY AN INDEPENDENT ACTION, UNDER 60(b) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THERE 
IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
POINT V 
THE MOST NOVEL ARGUMENT MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF 
IS THAT BECAUSE THE NUNC PRO TUNC DECREE WAS NOT 
ENTERED UNTIL 1984, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WOULD NNOT RUN UNTIL THAT ENTRY 9 
POINT VI 
JUDGE WILKINSON'S RULING CONCERNING THE SANCTIONS 
DOES NOT BAR THIS APPEAL 10 
POINT VII 
THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES 
JUDICATA ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 11 
POINT VIII 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PARTIES DIVORCE PROCEEDING 
SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THIS CASE 11 
CONCLUSION 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
12 
13 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Burke v. Burke 
733 P.2d, 498 (Utah 1986) 1,2 
St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 
645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982) 9 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) 8 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PATRICIA M. WADE, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Docket No. 890135 
vs. : 
RICHARD C. BURKE, : Priority 14(b) 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In reviewing the statement of the facts presented by the 
Plaintiff, Defendant takes issue with a number of allegedly 
factual allegations that are critical to a resolution of the 
issues in this appeal. 
The Court should take specific note that contrary to the 
assertions in Plaintiff's Brief (Page 5), that Plaintiff did not 
discover the scheme until 1984, that it is clear that this Court 
may take judicial notice of the divorce proceeding between 
Plaintiff and Defendant and the record that was prepared in that 
case, tried in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 
D15225, which was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in 73 3 
P.2d, 498 (Utah 1986) and that the facts contained therein do not 
support Plaintiff's assertion. 
In this case, Plaintiff has continually asserted that she 
was not aware of or believed that a scheme to fraudulently 
transfer property in connection with the Pepperwood property took 
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place until 1984, when the testimony in her divorce Trial, as set 
forth in the trial transcript which has now been certified and 
sent as part of the record herein, and the Memorandum of her 
counsel and the entire thrust of her argument throughout the 
divorce proceedings was that all property, including the 
Pepperwood property, had been fraudulently transferred from the 
Defendant to his sister, Sandra Maxwell. (See Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) 
The Court need only examine that divorce proceeding and 
the statements contained therein which were raised in both 
Summary Judgment Motions in this case to view the abundantly 
clear evidence that Plaintiff discovered the alleged scheme in 
1978 and not in 1984. (See Tp. 15-21, 149-150 of divorce 
proceedings in Burke v. Burke, Civil No. D15225) 
Secondly, with respect to the pleading of the affirmative 
defense of statute of limitations, contrary to the assertions of 
the Plaintiff in this action, Defendant affirmatively plead the 
statute of limitations as a defense in his answer, (see record on 
appeal) and raised the statute of limitations in two (2) separate 
Pretrial Motions. 
The Plaintiff also mischaracterizes what the Court did 
on the first Pretrial Motion. That Motion for Summary Judgment 
was filed on March 15, 1988, (Record 150-165) and in that Motion 
alleged that the Plaintiff knew of the alleged fraud during the 
divorce proceedings and therefore, was barred by the statute of 
limitation. 
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Counsel for the Plaintiff, in opposition, claimed that 
the issue was not ripe because additional discovery was necessary 
which would assist the Plaintiff in overcoming the statute of 
limitations problem and therefore, Judge Wilkinson, in an Order 
dated April 8, 1988, (see record 192-193) deferred ruling on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment until completion of discovery. 
Subsequent to that time, Mr. Larsen, counsel for the 
Plaintiff, took depositions of both Defendant and his sister, 
Sandra Maxwell, and received various documents. He then filed a 
Motion to Compel because of the alleged failure of Defendant and 
Mrs. Maxwell to provide certain documents requested in the 
discovery. The important fact about this Motion and the events 
subsequent thereto is that none of the requested discovery by Mr. 
Larsen had any bearing whatsoever on the issue of when his 
client, Plaintiff, knew or should have known about the alleged 
fraudulent acts complained of. 
The discovery consisted of request for documents which 
would show the activities of Defendant and Mrs. Maxwell both 
prior to and subsequent to 1978, attempting to show that they 
were in effect, acting to defraud the Plaintiff. None of the 
proposed discovery touched upon the alleged date that the 
Plaintiff knew about the actions or contradicted the clear 
testimony and actions taken in the divorce proceeding. 
In effect, this was simply a smoke screen submitted by 
counsel for the Plaintiff so that the Court would not see that in 
effect, no amount of discovery would change the facts of the 
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divorce case upon which the basic Summary Judgment issue could be 
determined. 
Plaintiff's characterization of Mrs. Maxwell's purjured 
testimony reletting to discovery, the aborted settlement of the 
case and the discovery sanctions against Mrs. Maxwell 
transferring one-half the property and the Motion for Summary 
Judgment Quieting Title are simply moot points, if in fact Judge 
Wilkinson should have ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment at 
either of the two (2) hearings and the facts submitted in support 
thereof are irrelevent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does have standing to raise the statute of 
limitations defense on behalf of himself. The thrust of the 
Plaintiff's entire argument throughout the divorce proceeding and 
this proceeding is that Mrs. Maxwell obtained title fraudulently 
through Defendant and that in effect, Defendant actually still 
retained title. 
If that is the case, then Defendant clearly has standing 
to assert these issues and Plaintiff cannot avail herself of one 
theory in the Trial Court and a separate theory at the Appellate 
Court in order to pervert the actual issues. 
The statute of limitations in this case is clearly a 
three (3) year statute of limitation and Plaintiff's arguments 
which seek to avert the gaze of the Court of at clear issue has 
no merit whatsoever. The Plaintiff's action should also be 
barred on the basis for res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
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POINT I 
DEFENDANT DOES HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT 
THE CLAIMS SET FORTH IN HIS MOTION 
Defendant agrees that to have standing in this Court he 
must be able to show that he has some interest in the lawsuit 
giving rise to this appeal. Plaintiff makes the cavalier 
argument that since Mrs. Maxwell did not appeal the case, 
Defendant cannot do so. This is undoubtedly the most incredibly 
naive statement that counsel for Defendant has ever seen in a 
Brief. For in excess of ten (10) years, Plaintiff has been 
asserting, in various forums in this State, that her husband 
defrauded her out of property that should have been part of a 
marital estate by making transfers to his sister and others. 
Plaintiff's claim essentially was that Defendant never 
actually transferred the property, but still owned the property 
in fact, although certain documents would state otherwise. The 
net effect of Judge Wilkinson's ruling, which has been appealed 
from, is that because of the alleged failure of this Defendant 
and Sandra Maxwell to comply with discovery, their answer was 
stricken and the prayer for relief in the Plaintiff's Complaint 
was granted. 
That prayer for relief, if one examines the record, is 
that the fraudulent conveyance be set aside and in fact, title be 
vested in Defendant and at that point, the Plaintiff would 
receive her one-half marital share. That is precisely the order 
counsel for Plaintiff sought and obtained by Judge Wilkinson's 
ruling. 
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Therefore, by her own actions in securing the judgment 
as she has, Plaintiff has given Defendant clear standing to 
bring this appeal, in effect claiming that the conveyance to 
Sandra Maxwell was set aside, the property was still in his name 
and now, title is quieted in the Plaintiff. 
Notwithstanding this argument, it is clear that the 
entire focus of the case is the Defendant. If Defendant's 
position is correct and he properly transferred this property to 
the Plaintiff, his actions in transferring the property properly, 
placed him as a party to the action brought by the Plaintiff and 
therefore, as a party who was unsuccessful in asserting his 
position, has standing to bring the appeal. 
The problem is that the District Court determined that 
Defendant actually owned the property by its ruling and counsel 
cannot avoid that as he made the Motion, he prepared the 
documents and he encouraged the Court to make such a ruling. He 
cannot now escape his own pleadings. Therefore, Defendant was 
not only a party to the action below, but has clear standing to 
bring the appeal to this Court. 
POINT II 
IF THIS COURT REVERSES THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION, IT WILL CLEARLY HAVE AN EFFECT 
UPON THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT AGAINST BOTH 
DEFENDANT AND MRS. MAXWELL 
Contrary to counsel's naked assertion that a reversal by 
this Court would not disturb what happened below, it is clear 
that if this Court finds that the statute of limitation barred 
the Plaintiff from even bringing this case, then the case is 
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dismissed on its face and the transfer of the property of 
Defendant to Mrs. Maxwell stands. The fact that Mrs. Maxwell 
chose not to appeal has no bearing on that decision. 
In effect, Defendant was determined to be the owner of 
the property under the Court's decision and then was foreclosed 
upon by the Plaintiff and a ruling by the Court in his favor 
would clearly reverse that determination and would moot the 
entire case on the basis of the statute of limitations. 
As to what will happen on a remand and whether or not 
Defendant's answer or other matters would be stricken, is only 
speculative on the part of the Plaintiff and negates the fact 
that this Court could find in effect, that there has been a clear 
violation of the statute of limitations and therefore, the action 
should be dismissed. This Court could also remand the case for 
further proceedings on the Motion for Summary Judgment, all of 
which could reverse the decision and place the property back with 
Mrs. Maxwell, through Defendant, which would obviously cause a 
different result than the District Court's decision. 
POINT III 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IS A THREE (3) YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The assertion by Plaintiff that this is a seven (7) year 
statute of limitations belies the fact that the gravaman of this 
case sounds in fraud. One must read Plaintiff's assertion very 
carefully when it indicates that "after title to one-half of the 
Pepperwood property was transferred to Mrs. Maxwell, then 
Defendant becomes in the status of any other creditor claiming an 
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interest and this was simply an action to quiet the title11. The 
of course would be true, but negates the fact that the issue in 
this case is whether or not the Court should have ever 
transferred one-half the property to Plaintiff on September 7, 
1988 in the first place. 
That transfer is subject to the statute of limitations 
defense for fraud, which is three (3) year's from the date of 
discovery. No where in the Plaintiff's Brief does the Plaintiff 
ever come to grips with the fact that the record is clear that 
she discovered whatever it was she claimed was fraudulent in 
1978, some seven (7) years prior to the filing of her initial 
Complaint and no clever manipulation of what actually happened in 
the Court proceedings as was suggested by Plaintiff's counsel in 
his Brief can controvert that fact. 
POINT IV 
COUNSEL ASSERTS WITHOUT ANY FOUNDATION 
WHATSOEVER, THAT BECAUSE THIS MATTER 
WAS PURSUED BY AN INDEPENDENT ACTION, 
UNDER 60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, THERE IS NO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Plaintiff claims she has filed an independent action to 
in effect, attack the judgment rendered in the Burke v. Burke 
divorce proceeding. (Which of course she claims this Court cannot 
consider as part of this appeal.) 
The unfortunate problem with her position is that if that 
is true, and she is simply attacking the judgment by means of an 
independent action in that case, she has done so by alleging not 
fraud upon the Court, but that a fraudulent conveyance took place 
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and that a fraudulent act was committed by the Defendant. The 
statute of limitations for fraud is three (3) years from the date 
of discovery. Discovery was in 1978 and the action was not filed 
until 1985. 
Even if this could be considered a complaint for faud 
upon the Court, the Courts of this State have determined that an 
independent action requires a showing that at the time of the 
original Trial, Plaintiff did not know of the fraud. In this 
case she did and presented testimony. All the evidence alleging 
the fraud was known to the Plaintiff at the time and she raised 
the issue in that proceeding. 
If in fact she raised the issue at that time, her remedy 
was to appeal and therefore, she is barred by the latches and res 
judicata and she has not demonstrated that she discovered 
anything new concerning the alleged fraudulent transfer 
afterwards that she could not have presented at the time of the 
Court. (See St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982) 
In addition, by alleging fraud, Plaintiff still comes 
within the purview of the three (3) year statute of limitations 
and is therefore, barred. 
POINT V 
THE MOST NOVEL ARGUMENT MADE BY THE 
PLAINTIFF IS THAT BECAUSE THE NUNC 
PRO TUNC DECREE WAS NOT ENTERED UNTIL 
1984, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
WOULD NOT RUN UNTIL THAT ENTRY 
Unfortunately, Plaintiff is the victim of her own 
machinations. It was she who sought a Decree of Divorce Nunc 
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Pro Tunc and had her own counsel prepare a Decree of Divorce and 
make it a Nunc Pro Tunc Decree, which by its definition, becomes 
effective as of the date of the original divorce in 1978. That 
is the very essence of a Nunc Pro Tunc Order, 
The Decree in no way changed what had happened six (6) 
years earlier and by making it Nunc Pro Tunc, the effective date 
upon which a statute would begin to run is the date of the entry 
of the Decree in 1978, thus Plaintiff is still barred. 
POINT VI 
JUDGE WILKINSON'S RULING CONCERNING 
THE SANCTIONS DOES NOT BAR THIS APPEAL 
With respect to Judge Wilkinson's ruling, using the 
failure of the Defendant and Mrs. Maxwell to comply with 
discovery as a basis for dismissing the action, the Court was 
given two (2) opportunities on a Motion in March and a subsequent 
Motion in September to rule on the statute of limitations issue. 
The fact that the Court chose to impose the sanctions and rule 
against the Defendant does not negate the fact that the statute 
of limitations issue was raised and was to have been decided by 
the Court. 
What actually happened to cause the difficulty in this 
case was the ciborted settlement of a Trial that was scheduled to 
begin July 25, 1988. There are considerable differences of 
opinion amongst the parties as to what actually caused the 
aborted settlement, but there is no question that the Defendant 
in this case did not agree to any settlement and did not in any 
way, agree to strike the Trial date. 
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Therefore, the Court, who used this aborted settlement in 
striking the Trial date as the basis for its adverse rulings, 
should not have made that ruling against this Defendant and 
should have considered the statute of limitations argument, thus 
making the sanctions argument moot. 
POINT VII 
THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND 
RES JUDICATA ARE APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE 
The only defense Plaintiff seems to raise against 
Defendant's res judicata - collateral estappel argument is that 
Mrs. Maxwell was not a party to the original divorce proceeding. 
The problem with that theory is that it is not Mrs. Maxwell whose 
actions are in question here, but Defendants. He was a party to 
the proceeding as was Plaintiff and the same allegations were 
made therein and therefore, simply the addition of Mrs. Maxwell 
as a recipient of Defendant's alleged fraudulent actions at a 
later date, does not cure the fact that the two (2) principal 
protagonists in this case were the principal protagonists in 
1978, the issues were raised, decided, not appealed from and 
therefore, collateral estoppel and res judicata do apply. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE PARTIES DIVORCE 
PROCEEDING SHOULD BE EXAMINED IN THIS CASE 
the allegation that the transcript on appeal from the 
divorce case should not be utilized by this Court in considering 
the issues on this appeal has no merit. This Court can take 
judicial notice of prior proceedings. They can take judicial 
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notice of the file and Court proceedings in the other case as it 
is an intregal part of both parties7 positions in this case. 
It is absolutely necessary that this Court consider the 
transcript in that case to determine whether or not the 
allegations of either party are true. Plaintiff is claiming that 
she knew nothing about this. Defendant is claiming it was 
raised. The entire issue can be resolved by reading the 
transcript of that divorce proceeding which has been made a part 
of these proceedings in the prior Motions for Summary Judgment, 
by pleadings and by references at the lower Court below and in a 
prior appeal. 
The Defendant's Memorandum that was utilized in the lower 
Court proceeding herein in support of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations defense 
quoted extensively from the Trial transcript of the divorce case 
and therefore, is properly before this Court and this Court by 
virtue of that portion of the transcript being in the record and 
the fact that it can take judicial notice of prior judicial 
proceedings that have been referenced herein can certainly review 
that transcript with a view, toward assertaing the truthfulness 
of the parties allegations herein. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Plaintiff, in her Respondent's Brief, 
raises the same smoke screen as was raised throughout the Trial, 
asserting various and sundry acts between Defendant and Mrs. 
Maxwell subsequent in time to cover the fact that she raised this 
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issue in her divorce proceeding, she failed to appeal it, she 
found no new evidence subsequent thereto and she simply waited 
too long to bring this action under a fraud complaint, after two 
(2) Amended Complaints and after a dismissal of the action for 
failure to prosecute, she again sought to raise this issue and is 
only then able to obtain a judgment, not on the merits of the 
case, by virtue of a sanction against the Defendant's for failure 
to comply with discovery. 
In a case of this magnitude concerning the property in 
question and the issues that are raised herein, the issues should 
not have been decided on a Sanctions Motion and therefore, this 
matter should be remanded with instructions of the Court to 
either enter a Judgment of Dismissal against the Plaintiff's 
Complaint on the basis of the statute of limitations or to allow 
the matter to proceed for further proceedings in a JTr^ ial on those 
issues. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/ & / tfhv j&y Ocfc/b^r ,//198j 
T. CAINE 
Attorney for Defendant 
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